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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
Now WHAT oF TRUST AND GIFT INCOME?
Truly the way of the taxpayer is hard. He is taxed if he does and taxed if he
doesn't. The current principle of taxation seems to be: 'Tis better to tax a thousand
non-tax avoiders than to let one tax-avoider escape. It is
Misanthropy getting to the point where it is presumed, almost as a matter
Rampant of law, that the only motive a man can have when he creates
a trust is to deprive the government of revenue. For centuries
before 1916 men created trusts for laudable purposes and received the benison of the
law. But now his motives are suspect and he is guilty of evil intentions until he
establishes his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Even so, he pays, most of the
time. When a father makes a gift to his daughter on her wedding day the tax-gatherer
sniffs an odor in the air which is not of orange blossoms. Is the poltroon trying to
reduce his surtax by getting rid of income-producing securities? And the rascal
thinks to reduce his estate taxes, too. "Sweet charity" are not bright words of the
tax lexicon.
Where, oh where, is that rule that a tax statute is to be construed in favor of the
taxpayer? Where is that naive faith that most men, even some rich men (perish the
thought), made gifts and set up trusts in the spirit of the
Time Sermon on the Mount? Gone, all gone, with the horse and
Was buggy, crinoline, bustle and mustache-cup to the heaven of
the dear, dead days beyond recall. Ah well, we drop a tear
and on to things in store. "Watchmen, what of the night?" Tell us what its signs of
promise are. For indeed signs and portents are in the skies. Nash, What Law of
Taxation? (1940) 9 FORDHAm L. Rav. 165.
Let us not burden the reader here with the steady progress of cases which have
taxed to the donor of trust funds the income of the trust if he retained a vestige of
control, or might by some concatenation of circumstances
Peace of come into enjoyment again of the principal, or if he devoted
Mind and the income to the discharge of his legal obligations. But
Happiness Burnet v. Wells, [289 U. S. 670 (1933)] must have a passing
notice. The settlor established an irrevocable trust to pay for
insurance on his life, the proceeds upon his death to be held or applied for the benefit
of his dependents. Although the court admitted that providing insurance for one's
dependents is not counted to be a legal obligation yet it is "in the thought of many
a pressing social duty". And, mark you, although he would never see the principal
or its income again under any circumstances whatever, yet the funding of the in-
surance policies would give him continuing "peace of mind and happiness". The
income of the trust was "used for his benefit in such a sense and to such a degree
that there is nothing arbitrary or tyrannical in taxing it as his."
Now along comes Horst and sweeps our doubts away. Helvering v. Horst, 61 Sup.
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Ct. 144 (1940). In a weak moment Father detached from bonds that he owned some
interest coupons not yet due and said: "Here, Son, is a little
Pleasurable gift. Cash the coupons as your own." Son did so when the
Sensations coupons matured. Who realized the income from the bonds?
You guessed the answer. Father. He "diverted the payment
from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants ...
Such use of his economic gain ... to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained
only by the expenditure of money or property, would seem to be the enjoyment of
income." He procured "a satisfaction which is procurable only by the expenditure
of money or money's worth."
Settlors! Donors! The next step is but a short one. The
The Night income of any trust for any purpose will soon be taxed to
Looks Dark you. The income of any gift will soon be taxed to you.
Any settlor once owned the property from which the income flows, did he not?
If he accumulated the principal by his own efforts he now takes a solid satisfaction
in observing the fruit of his endeavors devoted to an
Put Not object close to his heart. It may even give him peace of
Your Trust mind and happiness. Even one who creates a trust for the
in Trusts sole purpose of saving taxes will derive a malignant joy from
the hope (vain hope) that he has circumvented the Treasury.
If he had paid over the income, of the trusteed property to the beneficiary without
settling it in trust that would have been his income, would it not? Why bother
with such trivialities as the interposition of a trust? And so with gift; after all, a
trust is but a form of gift.
But hold-when he discovers that the income is taxable to him, his satisfaction,
peace and happiness take flight. Maybe he can't be taxed after such a discovery, only
before. I'm so confused, I can't think.
G. W. B.
STYLES IN COURT
With styles changing as rapidly as they do, we were not really surprised to learn
recently, that wearing a beard in court is no longer le dernier cri. A prisoner at the
bar of a New York tribunal protested against having his hair
A and his beard trimmed. However the court ordered the hair
New cut and the beard shaved. People v. Strauss, 174 Misc. 881,
Hair-Do 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 155 (County Ct. 1940); see also state v.
Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354, 60 S. W. 743 (1900). Because not
so long ago, courts were perfectly willing to have prisoners prevented from shaving,
[Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865 (1932)], we think this fluctuation in styles
should be brought to the attention of barbers and lawyers alike.
It seems as if the courts have permitted district attorneys to be arbiters of tonsorial
fashions. Certain it is that here, as in many other flexible rules of law, there is a
solid principle in the background.. In the Strauss case it was the District Attorney who
asked that the beard be shaved because he thought it would be used as a disguise to
prevent identification of the prisoner, and in the Ross case, it was the District Attorney
again who asked that the prisoner appear with the beard because he thought that the
absence of the beard was being used as a disguise. The judges were persuaded to
agree with them despite the argument of the prisoners that the procedure was a violation
of the constitutional privilege against being compelled to be a witness in one's own
criminal prosecution.
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There are other examples of law enforcement agencies preparing prisoners for
trial and setting the mode of dress for them. When a prisoner was forced to take his
clothes off in jail in order to be examined by a doctor for
Try wounds, the court held it proper. State v. Miller, 71 N. J. L.
It For 527, 60 AtI. 202 (1905). The defendant's objection, re-
Size phrased in terms similar to those used in the Strauss case, was
answered by the curt retort that the defendant was not
"testifying"; it was the examining doctor alone who was the witness. So a court
has compelled a defendant to take off his shirt to exhibit scars, and to don a shirt
found at the scene of the crime. State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926).
This practice seems to have the sanction of the United States Supreme Court. In
Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910) the accused was compelled to put on a
shirt in order to be identified as the person seen at the scene of the homicide. Justice
Holmes rationalized the court's position when he said: "But the prohibition of com-
pelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him .... "
(Italics supplied.) Wigmore states that the crux of the privilege is freedom from
testimonial compulsion. No one will be permitted "to extract from the person's own
lips an admission of his guilt. 8 WiGmo, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 2263,
2265. (Italics supplied.)
Thus it appears from the cases and text writers that the privilege against self-in-
crimination is not as broad as it seems at first glance. With recent scientific methods
such as fingerprinting, lie detectors, aidinz the prosecution in
Cut To the presentation of evidence, the courts will constantly meet
Fit new problems concerning the privilege. Summers, Science
Can Get The Confession (1939) 8 FoRiDAm L. REv. 334, 337.
The rule is flexible enough to solve such new situations, without the danger of future
curtailment of so vital a privilege. Narrow interpretation of the privilege, as were
pleaded for in the Strauss case and the Ross case, would make the administration
of the penal law hazardous and difficult.
HoiatMv To TAXPAYERS
Nothing is certain except death and taxes but some people will hope to the end
that they can avoid both. It is interesting to note the enormous amount of tax
litigation that springs from this hope. Section 23 (a) of the
Hope 1938 Revenue Act (and of previous revenue acts) provides
in Your that in computing taxable net income there shall be allowed
Heart as deductions: " . . . all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or
business". 26 U. S. C. A. 23 (a). In the leading case of Welch v. Helvering, [290
U. S. 111 (1933)] the court defines a "necessary expense" as one that is "appro-
priate and helpful" and an "ordinary expense" as one that is "common or frequent"
or "normal". Some hopeful sensed a way out.
Ned Sparks, the cantankerous character performer, recently requested the court
to allow him to deduct the sum of $3000 expended for false teeth, from his net
income, as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
Teeth in After several of his natural molars had been extracted, a
Your Law distressing hiss distorted his speech. Such articulation, ar-
gued Mr. Sparks, "would not do in my business". There-
upon he purchased two sets of artificial upper teeth. It was his opinion that $3000
[V/ol. 10
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of the money expended should be regarded as a business expense because with them
he earned considerable money. It seems he was willing to pay $500, for their use
at mealtimes. The forensic power of Mr. Sparks' hissless speech availed him not.
The court in its wisdom said, "It would be difficult to imagine anything more personal
than a set of false teeth". Teeth are intended to be and are used, not only during
business hours and for business purposes but at other times and for other purposes
as well as gnashing them at the courts, for example. Section 24 of the Revenue Act
of 1938 provides that personal, living or family expenses are not deductible in com-
puting net income. Sparkman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 112 F. (2d)
774 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940). Although in the case of Denny v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, [33 B. T. A. 738 (1935)] the Board of Tax Appeals ruled that the cost
of bridgework to replace teeth knocked out of an actor's mouth while making a prize-
fight picture was deductible as a necessary and ordinary business expense, the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was not overawed.
Maybe Sparks did not spend enough on his teeth. Or maybe he should have
given a false teeth party. The lavish Hollywood parties given by our cinematic
stars are a methodical madness. Much of the money spent
Sparkle in on these ventures can be considered an ordinary and neces-
Your Eye sary business expense. These affairs enhance the reputation
of the actor and tend to secure theatrical engagements more
easily. Blackmer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 70 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934). Likewise the expenditures of a lawyer in entertaining his clients at a country
club are considered professional expenses. King v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
10 B. T. A. 1297 (1927). But compare Ellis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
[50 F. (2d) 343 (App. D. C. 1931)] in which the court held that a lawyer, who
was appointed a member of a special committee by the American Bar Association to
study and report on criminal procedure in Europe, could not deduct the expenses of
the trip as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
While income derived from an illicit business, is taxable, even when its illegal
nature is declared by the Constitution, the suggestion that the tax-payer would be
entitled to deduct illegal expenses such as bribery brought
Payment in the curt judicial retort: "This by no means follows, but it
Your Palm will be time enough to consider the question when a tax-
payer has the temerity to raise it". United States v. Sulli-
van, 274 U. S. 259, 264 (1927). However in Alexandria Gravel Co. Inc. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, [95 F. (2d) 615 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938)] a company de-
ducted payments made to a person, in fact a state senator, to sell gravel to the state
highway department. The majority of the court took a "liberal" view and said,
"The revenue laws of the United States are not over-squeamish", and because it
could not find any testimony that Senator Dore, in fact, agreed to use personal or
political influence, the taxpayer is not to be deprived of his right to these deductions.
The court insists on a clear showing that the transactions were tainted. Compare
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunset Scavenger Co., Inc., 84' F. (2d) 453
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
All this seems to indicate that a wise man will pay his taxes and let it go at that.
Lawyers, boards of tax appeals, investigators from the department of internal revenue
are an unpredictable group. One never knows whether they will see it the right
way. They disturb one's rest. They upset one's digestion. And at the end it might
well be asked even if success crowns one's efforts "What doth it profit a man?"
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-IN MODERN DREss
Doing things backwards seemingly attracts both attention and good fortune to all
except lawyers. We have noticed how an intrepid pilot took off in a plane for Cali-
fornia and landed in Ireland and the arms of fame. Many
Fame in remember the football player who scored a touchdown on
Reverse a brilliant run down the field, later discovering that he had
crossed the goal line he should have been defending, but
earning honors and gratitude from the opposing student body. Columbus started off
in the wrong direction and wound up in marble and bronze. Lately, proceeding
backwards has become fashionable in the law if we are to believe some author's
descriptions of successful judicial behavior. The process is to arrive at a decision of
litigation by first deciding the issues on the basis of a hunch or guess and then
searching for reasons. FRA€I, LAw AND MODERN MIND (1930) 103. Such action
never suffers the indignity of a reversal.
Yet, we advise the profession to eschew the backward advance on the basis of
recent cases which warn of its unprofitable character. A rare and tragi-comic ici-
dent occurred during an upstate criminal trial. It upset the
Not According usual concept of District Attorneys as impassive, impersonal
to Hoyle and persistent prosecutors. After the state had completed
its case and rested, the District Attorney made a motion
for a mistrial in behalf of the defendant, over strenuous objection of the prisoner's
counsel. The trial judge, confused but courageous, granted the motion. It was later
held error to grant the motion, but to retry the defendant would subject him to
double jeopardy. People ex rel. Totalis v. Craver, 174 Misc. 325, 20 N. Y. S. (2d)
533 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The New York Courts are committed to the view that the
improper discharge of a jury before rendering a verdict places the defendant in
jeopardy. He may not be retried again for the same crime. People ex rel. Brinkman
v. Barr, 248 N. Y. 126, 161 N. E. 444 (1928); People ex rel. Herbert v. Hanley, 142
App. Div. 421, 126 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1st Dep't 1911). Thus one District Attorney
will have to stand for re-election on the basis of having accomplished an indirect
acquittal.
Another instance of "putting the cart before the horse" is found in the case of
Matter of Herle, [173 Misc. 879, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 263 (Sur. Ct. 1940)]. A petition
was filed in Surrogate's Court praying that an alleged will
According be denied probate before probate proceedings had even been
to "Herle" instituted. While the court did not decide the question it
seems that this attorney was not so much off the beaten
track. It has been held in Irving v. Bruen, [110 App. Div. 558, 97 N. Y. Supp. 180
(3rd Dep't 1906), aff'd 186 N. Y. 605 (1906)] that under Section 2653 (a) of the
Code of Civil Procedure an action at law may not be maintained to set aside a will
before probate, but suit may be brought in equity for such relief. Apparently, the
court, by analogy could reach the same conclusion under Section 147 of the Surro-
gate's Court Act which permits an action to set aside the probate of a will.
There are some who cannot distinguish motion from progress and they are happy
if only they are going somewhere. Forward or backward, direction is not important
to them. But the rules of procedure require forethought of
Travel by the results of the procedural device selected. It may or may
the Compass not be fruitful. But it will not do to start off on a route
the end of which we know not. The goal reached may be
the land of milk and honey but equally well it may be the desert isle. Before we
announce that we are "on our way", let us give thought to our juristic destination.
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